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Abstract 
 
Following from Part I of this paper, which introduced the notion of decision-
modelling for investor-state arbitration, Part II of the paper uses the game theoretic 
notions developed in Part I to explore the question of why a relatively large fraction 
of investor-state disputes proceed to arbitration tribunals. Likely explanations are 
advanced.  The detailed mathematical model derived in Part I of the paper is then 
used to analyse 31 cases where an investor-state dispute has been judged by an 
arbitration tribunal.  Auxiliary mathematics are developed to identify the relevant 
averages and variances, which are then calculated from the full data set.  Three 
sample cases are analysed in greater detail, with the model results being compared 
against the actual awards.  It is concluded that applying the mathematical model of 
the international arbitration process developed in Part I together with the data 
analysis laid out in Part II will provide useful insight and guidance to both parties 
involved or likely to be involved in a dispute between investor and state. 
 
1.  Introduction  
 
The first Part of this paper considered the application of a decision-model to a 
specific form of international dispute settlement, the increasingly popular Investor-
State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) which consists of claims brought by investors 
against host states under bilateral investment treaties. Part II of the paper considers 
first why relatively many disputes between investors and states are not settled 
between the parties but proceed to arbitration.  Then, in the main part of the paper, 
the modelling laid out in Part I1 is applied to 31 cases of ISDS that went to 
arbitration between 2012 and the first half of 2014.   
 
The data and their limitations are discussed before moving on to the auxiliary 
modelling needed to allow the theoretical results of Part I to be applied.  The analysis 
of the full data set allows average properties, together with variances, to be 
                                                          
1 M. Broom, D. Collins, H. Vu and P. Thomas, ‘The Four Regions in Settlement Space: A Game-
Theoretical Approach to Investment Treaty Arbitration. Part I: Modelling’, Law, Probability and Risk, 
Vol. xx, No. yy (20zz)  
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estimated.  These are then used in the detailed consideration of three cases from the 
sample, where actual outcomes are compared with what the new model would have 
predicted or recommended.  A discussion of the results is provided before drawing 
conclusions.  Further consideration of the “zone of uncertainty” defined in Part I is 
provided in Appendix B. The workings in this Appendix (and elsewhere in Part II) 
use symbols previously defined in Appendix A of Part I, as well as a number of new 
symbols.  The latter have been listed, along with their definitions, in Appendix A of 
this Part. 
 
2. Why do ISDS cases proceed to arbitration? 
 
Our model follows the assumption of a sequence of events culminating in a single 
offer by the respondent (always the state in ISDS), which is accepted or rejected by 
the claimant (always the investing firm in ISDS), as illustrated in Figure 1.  
Assuming risk neutrality, this leads to a unique settlement at the level minv  as 
previously stated.  But we can use the diagram of the settlement space, Figure 2, to 
explore in outline what could happen if the requirement for a single, “take it or leave 
it” offer to be made by the respondent were relaxed. 
 
A settlement of maxv  would occur if the accepted procedure was for the claimant 
rather than the respondent to make a single offer, which the respondent had to take or 
leave.  It is also the settlement level when a sequence of offers is permitted, provided 
it is known and accepted that the claimant will make the final one. 
 
If a period of negotiation were allowed, with offer and counter offer, but without 
prior specification of the side to make the final offer, then the offer eventually 
accepted would end up somewhere in Region 4 of the “settlement space” shown in 
Figure 2.  The position would depend on the details of the process and it is hard to 
predict for a real situation exactly where within the region the settlement would 
finish up after a prolonged negotiation.  Appendix B provides a preliminary 
consideration and describes some of the issues facing claimant and respondent in this 
area of the settlement space.  A full analysis of such multi-step negotiations is, 
however, beyond the scope of the current paper.   
 
Nevertheless an important conclusion that we can draw is that whilst such 
negotiation can change the level of settlement, skilful negotiation should always 
produce a settlement. So how do we reach a situation where there is no settlement 
between the parties, so that the case proceeds to arbitration and award, as clearly 
often happens in real cases? Three possible reasons are discussed below. 
 
Firstly, different attitudes to risk, considered previously in Section 3.5 of Part I of the 
paper. Different levels of risk-aversion may change the settlement level (which may 
even lie outside Region 4 of the “settlement space”, as discussed).  But unless one or 
both parties actively prefers risk, different levels of risk-aversion should not lead to 
the invocation of an arbitration tribunal. This is thus perhaps the least plausible 
reason. 
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Secondly, the outcome may be affected by external factors such as reputation. It may 
be that both parties need to be seen to take the case as far as they can and not 
compromise, e.g. for the type of political reasons discussed in Section 3.5 of Part I in 
the case of the respondent state. If immediate monetary factors are not the prime 
concern, then both sides may be prepared to accept an outcome that is suboptimal 
from the point of view of our analysis, and there can be a contested case. This can be 
so even if money is the overriding factor, but when at least one of the parties sees the 
potential for similar cases in the future, and so needs to be seen to be defending its 
interests. 
 
Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, a contest can be caused by differing 
parameter estimates. The most salient case would arise when the parties come to 
different estimates of the claimant’s success probability p.  Consider the settlement 
space characterised by the two dimensions, p and v, as plotted in Figure 2.  We can 
think of this in terms of the value of v selected by the respondent being based upon 
its estimate of claimant success probability, namely, Rp , where the subscript, 'R', 
signifies that it is the respondent's estimate. It is not difficult to imagine that this 
could be different, possibly significantly different, from the estimate of p arrived at 
by the claimant, Cp ,where the subscript, 'C', signifies that it is the claimant's estimate.  
 
If the two p values differ by a sufficiently large amount, so that the minimum sum 
judged acceptable by the claimant, ( )min Cv p , is larger than the maximum the 
respondent would countenance, ( )max Rv p , then clearly there could never be a 
settlement.  Such a situation arises for the values of Rp  and Cp  shown in Figure 2.   
This graph (or its equivalent for any real case, for example Figures 4, 5 and 6) could 
be used to assess, for any given estimate of claimant probability made by one party, 
the range of different claimant probabilities that, were they believed true by the other 
party, would lead to a dispute.  
 
Note further that if each party were to assume that the other made the same estimate 
of claimant success probability, p, even a minute difference between the two 
assessed values would lead to the dispute proceeding to arbitration in the single, 
“take-it-or-leave-it” case provided that, in addition, C Rp p> .  Now the respondent 
would offer ( ) ( )min minR Cv p v p< , which would inevitably be rejected. It is possible, 
of course, that through a period of negotiation the parties would revise their 
parameter estimates and a dispute could still be avoided.  Nevertheless a difference 
between the estimates of the claimant's probability of success on the part of the two 
players remains a likely reason why so many cases end up in arbitration before a 
tribunal. 
 
3.  Data and Limitations 
The data used in this article were gathered from investor-state disputes that were 
made publicly available. As such, it is conceded from the outset that the results 
derived from this study may present a distorted picture of parties’ arbitration 
strategies.  This admitted “observational bias” is an inescapable consequence of the 
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private nature of arbitration.2 Law and economics scholars have identified concerns 
regarding the use of small samples of cases from which to derive theories or models 
of general application, noting chiefly again the small minority of all disputes that 
actually proceed to trial.3 The difficulty of obtaining a sample that is truly 
representative of all disputes, including those that are settled between the parties, has 
been addressed in part through the 50:50 model (developed by Priest and Klein) 
which argued that where gains and losses to parties from litigation are equal, then 
claimants should win 50% of the time. In other words, the relative stakes of the 
parties should influence outcomes for all cases. Accordingly, where stakes among 
parties are uneven, success rates should differ from the 50% baseline.4 The extent of 
to which this rule applies to ISDS is questionable precisely because the relative gains 
and losses for the parties tend to be highly disparate. As indicated above, defendant 
states have the potential to lose massive amounts of money and suffer significant 
adverse reputational effects as repeat players, whereas claimant firms do not face 
counter-claims nor is there necessarily a high risk that they will be required to pay 
the state’s costs if they lose. For firms, investments are sunk at the point of litigation 
and a loss should not affect their capacity to invest elsewhere in the future.  (As will 
be seen in Section 4, the findings of this paper provide some limited support for a 
deviation in the right direction from the 50:50 model.  The average investor's chance 
of success before the arbitration tribunal falls below a half, as would be predicted by 
its lower possible loss.  The effect is rather small, however.) 
  
This study considered only those arbitrations which satisfied the two following 
conditions. Firstly, only final awards in which substantive claims were resolved were 
considered.  Such decisions are the final decision outlining the outcome of the 
dispute (whether or not compensation is payable and in what quantum) and are most 
analogous to the judgment in conventional domestic legal proceedings. This 
requirement eliminated decisions on jurisdiction as well as interim awards and other 
procedural matters, which, while often containing data on costs, lacked a final 
disposition with respect to damages and compensation.5 The second requirement is 
that the awards were issued in English. This condition discounted only a handful of 
awards as English is the dominant language of most published investor-state 
arbitrations. Finally, in the interests of managing the quantity of data for this small 
                                                          
2 Several academic studies have evaluated the costs and benefits associated with civil procedure 
(including various cost regimes) in domestic legal systems: e.g. S Shavell, ‘Suit, Settlement and Trial: 
A Theoretical Analysis under the Alternative Methods for the Allocation of Legal Costs’ 11:1 Journal 
of Legal Studies 55 (1981); J Hughes and E Snyder, ‘Litigation and Settlement Under the English and 
American Rules: Theory and Evidence’ 38 Journal of Law and Economics 225 (1995); J Donohue, 
‘Opting for the British Rule: If Posner and Shavell Can’t Remember Coase Theorem, Who Will?’ 104 
Harvard Law Review 1093 (1991); E Carbonara and F Parisi, ‘Rent-Seeking and Fee Shifting: The 
Hidden Virtues of Limited Fee Shifting’ 11:2 Review of Law and Economics 113 (2015); A Farmer 
and M Pecorino, ‘Liability Standards with Uncertain Outcomes at Trial’ 
http://mycba.ua.edu/~ppecorin/liability_standards_with_an_uncertain_outcome_at_trial_september_2
014.pdf 
3 GL Priest and B Klein, ‘The Selection of Disputes for Litigation’ 13:1 Journal of Legal Studies 1 
(1984) 
4 Investor-to-State-Dispute Settlement: Some Facts and Figures, European Commission Report (12 
March 2015) at 8-9. http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/january/tradoc_153046.pdf . 
5 In one sense host states may be seen to have ‘won’ a dispute when they succeed in establishing that 
the arbitration tribunal lacks jurisdiction over the dispute, however this may not result in the final 
disposition of the issue as the investor may still seek remedies in other fora. 
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study and to depict arbitration strategies based on recent trends observed in ISDS, 
this article considers only awards issued from 2012 until the first half of 2014.  
 
In total 31 disputes were used for data collection. The aggregate data obtained from 
these awards is presented in Tables 1 and 2. It should be noted that in some cases 
specific monetary amounts were not claimed by investors, rather these claimants 
asked for “full compensation” or “such relief as the tribunal considered just”.  
Moreover, party costs (which tend to be relatively small) were not always divulged, 
nor was there always clear differentiation between each party’s legal costs and the 
tribunal’s own costs. Where this information was made available it is included in 
Table 1.  
 
4. Data analysis 
 
4.1 General overview 
The model equations derived in Part I of the paper may be used to calculate what 
settlement amount might be appropriate to avoid the cost, time and trouble for both 
parties of going to arbitration, an exercise that should be of value to both claimants 
and respondents involved in ISDS.  
 
We derived data from 31 arbitral awards made in 2012, 2013 and 2014 in order to 
apply the game-theoretical model, as summarized in Table 1.  Table 2 identifies the 
various parties to the disputes and the year in which arbitration occurred.  It should 
be noted in advance that since the monetary values of disputes were given in a range 
of different currencies, we have converted all cases to US dollars6 for consistency 
and ease of comparison.  The data do not provide information on the pre-tribunal 
expenses, 2,1 , =iEPTi  (where the index, 1, refers to the claimant and the index, 2, 
refers to the respondent) and we make the assumption, believed to be reasonable, that 
these are small compared with the legal costs incurred by going before the arbitration 
tribunal.   
 
At the time when a settlement is being considered, vertex Y for the respondent and 
vertex Zv for the claimant on the game tree of Figure 1, neither party can have 
foreknowledge of which party will win, nor of the extent of the claimant’s award 
should it be successful.  It may be assumed, however, that legal advisers to both 
claimant and respondent will have access to historic data on previous arbitration 
decisions by which to judge the likely size of the payoffs, 1B  and 2B  when the 
claimant wins, and 1C  and 2C  when the claimant loses.  In our case, we regard it as 
permissible to use average values for ratios formed from the sample of decisions 
contained in Tables 1 and 2 in order to estimate payoff values, which may then be 
used to generate predicted settlements that may be compared with the awards made 
by the arbiters in practice.  This procedure derives from the assumptions that (i) the 
sample is random and (ii) the statistical properties of the data are stationary, so that 
similar averages would be found from analyzing any set of arbitration decisions 
chosen at random. 
 
                                                          
6 We used a conversion date of 30 June 2013, roughly the mid-point of our three-year period 2012-
2014. The Euro-USD conversion rate on that date was; 1 Euro=1.30132 USD. 
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4.2  Average ratios derived from the sample 
Average values are computed for six ratios.  The fraction, 1f  , of the respondent’s 
legal costs borne by the claimant if it loses before the arbitration tribunal may be 
regarded as the ratio: 
 
( )
2
1
2
1 E
Ef =   (1) 
 
where 2E  represents the respondent’s total fees (pre-tribunal and at-tribunal), while 
( )1
2E  is the share of the respondent’s legal costs borne by the claimant if it loses.  This 
leaves the respondent responsible for the fraction, 11 f− , of its costs.  
 
Conversely, if the claimant wins the arbitration, the fraction, 2f  , of the claimant’s 
legal costs borne by the respondent may be seen to be the ratio: 
 
( )
1
2
1
2 E
Ef =   (2) 
 
where 1E  represents the claimant’s total fees (pre-tribunal and at-tribunal), while 
 ( )21E  is the share of the claimant’s legal costs borne by the respondent if the claimant 
wins.  Now the claimant is responsible for the fraction, 21 f− , of its legal costs. 
 
The fraction, 1g , contributed to the arbitration cost by the claimant when it wins is 
 
A
A
E
Eg 11 =   (3) 
 
where AE  represents the total arbitration costs while 1AE  is the arbitration cost borne 
by the claimant.  Hence the fraction of the arbitration cost borne by the respondent 
when the claimant wins is 11 g− . 
 
Similarly, when the claimant loses, the fraction, 2g , contributed to the arbitration 
cost by the respondent is 
 
A
A
E
Eg 22 =   (4) 
 
where 2AE  is the arbitration cost borne by the respondent.  This leaves the losing 
claimant the burden of paying the fraction, 21 g− , of the arbitration cost. 
 
Finally, the ratio, ACr , of the award given by the arbitration tribunal to the claimant 
when the claimant wins to the sum sought by the claimant is: 
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CC
C
AC S
Sr =   (5) 
 
where CCS  is the size of the claim while CS  is the size of the award made by the 
tribunal, not including legal and arbitration expenses. 
 
Average values, , and ,,, 2121 ACaveaveaveaveave rggff  have been derived for these five 
ratios as shown at the bottom of Table 1, which also gives estimates of the standard 
deviations.  Consider first the fractions, 1f  and 2f .  The data reveal that: 
 
___1
1
___2
2
___
1 1
___
2 2
0.302;  0.413;  0.100  based on the 17 claimant losses
0.286;  0.414;  0.111  based on the 14 claimant wins
ave f
f
ave f
f
f f
f f
σ σ
σ σ
= = = =
= = = =
   (6) 
 
where Xσ  signifies the estimated standard deviation of X, while ___
X
σ , also known as 
the standard error, signifies the estimated standard deviation of the average, X , of X. 
The strong similarity between both 1avef  and 2avef  and 1fσ  and 2fσ  suggests that 
arbitration tribunals tend to treat the award of legal costs equally as regards claimant 
and respondent, in the sense that the winning party can expect to have roughly 30% 
its costs paid by the losing protagonist. 
 
In a similar way, the winning party, claimant or respondent, can expect to pay only 
about a third of the total arbitration costs: 
 
__1
1
__2
2
___
1 1
___
2 2
0.333;  0.222;  0.064  based on the 12 claimant wins, using available data
0.328;  0.243;  0.070  based on the 12 claimant losses, using available data
ave g
g
ave g
g
g g
g g
σ σ
σ σ
= = = =
= = = =
(7) 
 
Regarding a 50-50 split as the default position on arbitration costs, equation set (7) 
implies that the losing protagonist will pick up about a third (33%) of the winner’s 
default share of arbitration costs.  The similarity between the discharge by the losing 
party of 33% of the winner’s default arbitration costs and its reimbursement of 30% 
of the winning party’s legal costs indicates that the arbitration tribunals tend, on 
average, to treat the legal and arbitration costs in a consistent way. 
 
An important deduction from analyzing the data is that the arbitration tribunals tend 
to award a significantly lower sum than the claimant has professed to seek.  The 
average value of the ratio, CCCAC SSr = , may be found: 
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____
___
0.477;  0.366;  0.098  based on the 14 claimant wins
AC
AC
ACave AC r
r
r r σ σ= = = =  (8) 
 
The standard deviation, 
ACr
σ  is large, however, and does not rule out a tribunal 
awarding the full amount in particular cases.  (This happened in just two of the 31 
cases considered, case 18, Deutsche Bank v. Sri Lanka, and case 20, Occidental 
Petroleum v. Ecuador, although there were others with high values of ACr , as can be 
seen from Table 1.) 
 
Finally, the probability, p , may be regarded as the mean of a binary indicator 
variable, V (for “victory”), that registers 1 when the claimant wins and 0 when the 
claimant loses, as shown in Table 1.  It is possible to estimate an average value, avep : 
 
047.0   ;452.0 __
___
====
V
pave ave
Vp σσ   (9) 
 
4.3  Calculation of the payoffs 
Using the definitions introduced above, the payoff 1B  may be written: 
 
( )1 1 2 11AC CC AB r S g E f E= − − −    (10) 
 
However, while 1 and , EES ACC  may be known or estimated by both parties, the 
values, ,, 1grAC  and 2f , will not be known at vertex Zv on the game tree of Figure 1.  
Hence our strategy is to subsitute the mean values discussed above to produce an 
estimate, 1Bˆ , for 1B : 
 
( )1 1 2 1ˆ 1ACave CC ave A aveB r S g E f E= − − −   (11) 
 
In an analogous way, we may produce estimates for 2B , 1C  and 2C  as: 
 
( )2 1 2 2 1ˆ 1ACave CC ave A aveB r S g E E f E= − − − − −   (12) 
 
( )1 2 1 1 2ˆ 1 ave A aveC g E E f E= − − − −    (13) 
 
( )2 2 1 2ˆ 1ave A aveC g E f E= − − −     (14) 
 
The estimated values, 1Bˆ  and 1Cˆ  may be used in place of 1B  and 1C  to estimate the 
lower limit of condition (38) of Part I: 
 
 1
1 1
ˆ
ˆ* ˆ ˆ
Cp
C B
=
−
  (15) 
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which gives an estimate of the lower limit, *p , for claimant success, such that a 
claim should be pursued only if *p p> .   
 
Given the enforced but reasonable assumption that the pre-tribunal costs are small: 
0PTiE ≈ , in equations (22) and (28) of Part I, estimates may be made for minv  and 
maxv  as functions of claimant success-probability, p: 
 
( ) ( )min 1 1ˆˆˆ 1v p pB p C= + −    (16) 
  
and 
 
( ) ( )max 2 2ˆˆ 1v p pB p C= − − −    (17) 
 
Putting avep p= , as recorded in equation (9), into equations (16) and (17) gives the 
central estimates, ( )minˆ avev p  and ( )maxˆ avev p . 
 
4.4  Estimating the go-no-go probability, p* 
 
As noted above, the ‘go-no-go probability’, p*, may be estimated as ˆ *p  using 
equation (15).  Performing the calculations for the 25 out of 31 cases where the data 
allow produces the graph of the estimated go-no-go probability, *pˆ ,versus case 
number shown in Figure 3.  The central estimate, 0.452, of the claimant’s average 
probability of success, avep , is also marked up, together with the 90% confidence 
interval.   
 
There are four instances where  *pˆ  exceeds even the upper value of the 90% 
confidence interval, and these are highlighted.  Clearly the claimant must feel very 
sure of its ground to bring forward a case in such circumstances.  When 1*ˆ =p , a 
value that occurs in cases 2 and 22, the implication is that the claimant must be 
completely certain that the arbitration tribunal will decide in its favour.  But while a 
claimant win occurred in one such case, 22, the other, 2, was lost, which suggests 
that the claimant’s presumed confidence was misplaced.  A similar split between 
winning and losing is revealed in another two instances, where the probability of 
success needed to be above about 70% for the claimant reasonably to proceed.   
 
Based on general experience, it would seem unwise for the claimant to proceed on 
the basis of such a high value of   p*,  unless either the claimant’s case is exceptional 
or the benefit from winning before the arbitration tribunal consists of more than 
immediate financial redress –the claimant's reputation being at stake might be one 
motivator.   
 
To put this in context, consider case 22, Quasar de Valors v. Russia.  The claimant 
made a claim for $2.63M, but incurred legal costs of $14.57M as well as arbitration 
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costs of $0.63M.  In the event, the claimant won, but was awarded only $2.03M, 
meaning that the whole exercise carried a large net financial penalty to the claimant. 
 
5.  Sample Cases 
 
The results derived above will be used to analyse three cases, with the claims 
spanning the range from about $10M, through $100M to more than $1 bn. 
 
5.1 Anatolie Stati, Gabriel Stati, Ascom Group SA and Terra Raf Trans Trading Ltd 
v. Kazakhstan7 
In this dispute, a group of Moldovan investors brought a claim against the Republic 
of Kazakhstan under the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) in relation to various 
interferences, including seizures of assets associated with petroleum investments. 
The tribunal ultimately ruled in favour of the investor, finding that the host state had 
breached several provisions of the ECT, including the guarantee of Fair and 
Equitable Treatment and the failure to pay appropriate compensation for 
expropriation.   
 
The tribunal awarded the investor US $506 million (interest not yet included), the 
largest award in the history of the ECT at that point and one of the largest treaty 
arbitration awards of all time.  Of this figure, the respondent was ordered to pay to 
the claimant a net amount of US$ 497,685,101 (subtracting the subtotal of debts 
owed by the investor to the host state from the subtotal of compensation due). This 
net amount was to be paid with interest, compounded semi-annually.  While 
unquestionably large, this amount should be contrasted with the initial claim for 
relief requested by the investor of US $2.97 billion. In other words, while strictly 
speaking the claimants ‘won’ the arbitration, they received only approximately 17% 
of what they claimed initially. This significant discrepancy can be explained by the 
tribunal’s assessment that the investor exaggerated the value of the assets that had 
been seized by Kazakhstan. As such, the realignment of asset value represents a 
major risk to investors when deciding to bring claims when they have suffered an 
interference under the host state’s laws. 
 
Table 1 lists the costs for Anatolie Stati v Kazakhstan as Case 7.  Estimating the 
outturn parameters 1 2 1ˆˆ ˆ, ,B B C  and 2Cˆ  enables both minv  and maxv  to be calculated as 
functions of claimant success probability, p, using equations (16) and (17).  
 
It is striking that there will be an incentive for the claimant Anatolie Stati to take the 
case forward as long as there is the slimmest of chances of success in court: anything 
greater than a go-no-go probability of 017.0* =p .  The government of Kazakhstan 
should have expected Anatolie Stati to bring the case forward and presumably it did 
consider settlement as a result.  Figure 4 shows the settlement space. 
 
If it is assumed that the probability of success for Anatolie Stati was the claimant 
average, namely 452.0=p , Kazakhstan should have made an offer of ( )minˆ avev p  = 
$621M, as calculated from equation (16).  If Anatolie Stati et al. had agreed that their 
                                                          
7 Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, date of award 19 December 2013 
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chance of success in the arbitration was indeed 45.2%, then it would have been 
logical for that consortium to have accepted this offer. 
 
The state of Kazakhstan’s absolute maximum offer, including allowance for a higher 
risk-aversion, would have been ( )maxˆ avev p  = $658M, an increase of only about 5% 
above ( )minˆ avev p .  
 
In fact, the case went before an arbitration tribunal, which ultimately awarded the 
claimants $506M gross, $497,685,101 net, which was about 20% less than the sum 
predicted for settlement above. Enforcement of this award was successful in US and 
Swedish courts, however a UK court recently held that enforcement in the UK could 
be stayed pending the determination of whether the arbitral award had been obtained 
by fraud, there being a sufficiently strong case that the claimant had withheld vital 
documents.8 
 
5.2 Burimi SRL and Eagle Games SH.A v the Republic of Albania9 
In this case, numbered 13 on Table 1, it was the respondent host state that won, with 
the tribunal dismissing all the claims. The dispute arose from investors’ activities in 
the Albanian gambling industry which were harmed by Albania’s introduction of a 
series of new regulations interfering with Burimi’s business activities. The claimants 
sought damages for expropriation under the Italy-Albania Bilateral Investment 
Treaty (BIT) as well as a breach of the minimum standard of treatment under 
customary international law. The tribunal held under the auspices of the International 
Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) ruled that the first claimant 
had failed to comply with requirements of the BIT to make best efforts to negotiate 
an amicable settlement in light of the changed regulations. The other investor lacked 
jurisdiction because its activities were considered to be a private loan agreement, not 
an investment.  Consequently, the tribunal unanimously dismissed all of the 
claimants’ claims.  The cost parameters are as laid out in Table 1.  
 
The settlement space is shown in Figure 5.  In this case the claimant needs a 
probability of success in the tribunal to be about 1 in 8 in order to proceed (
ˆ* 0.126p =  from equation (15)).  The settlement amount suggested by equation (16) 
is now ( )minˆ avev p  = $2.07M, about a sixth of the claim of $12.6M.  It is noticeable 
that with much lower sums at stake in comparison with the first case, legal and 
administrative fees are relatively much larger.  This results in ( )maxˆ avev p  = $3.26M, 
which is more than 50% greater than ( )minˆ avev p . 
 
However, as noted above, no award was made because the case was rejected by the 
arbitration tribunal. 
 
5.3  ACHMEA B.V. v the Slovak Republic10 
                                                          
8 Anatolie Stati and others v Republic of Kazakhstan [2017] EWHC 1348 (Comm) 
9 ICSID Case No. ARB/11/18, Award (29 May 2013) 
10 PCA Case No. 2013-12 (UNCITRAL Rules) (Award, 7 December 2012) 
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This case concerned a claim brought by a Dutch health insurance company against 
the state of Slovakia because of the government’s plan to run a unitary public health 
care service, a scheme which effectively undermined the investor’s stake in a 
domestic insurance company. It was accordingly framed as an expropriation and was 
brought under the Netherlands-Slovakia BIT. The claimant sought $100M in 
compensation from the Slovak Republic. 
 
High legal fees were incurred by both parties, particularly the respondent, which 
spent $17.37M.  Meanwhile the claimant incurred legal costs of $5.96M.  Figure 6 
shows the diagram of the settlement space.   
 
In this instance, the claimant would need to have been satisfied that its chances of 
winning before the tribunal were over 21% before bringing the case.  For the average 
claimant success probability of 45.2%, the amount that a risk-neutral respondent 
ought to offer would have been ( )minˆ avev p  = $13.04M.  The maximum that a 
respondent could offer before exceeding its expected payoff at the tribunal would 
have been significantly higher at ( )maxˆ avev p  = $37.24M. 
 
In the event the case went before an arbitration tribunal and the claimant was 
awarded $28.42M.  This bigger payout, roughly twice ( )minˆ avev p ,  reflects the fact 
that the claimant has won its case, removing the reliance on an expected value to 
assess the level of the claimant’s payout.  It is no longer necessary to take an average 
of the two payoffs, 1B   and  1C , with weighting factors, p and 1 – p respectively (as 
in equation (16)).  The losing payoff, 1C , drops out of consideration, leaving only  
1B , which is obviously a factor of 1 p  larger than 1pB .  Assuming 0.45avep p= =  , 
this factor is about 2.0.  
 
6. Discussion  
The general solution for the ISDS “game” based on the decision tree shown in Figure 
1 has led to the settlement space being partitioned into four distinct regions, in three 
of which no settlement is possible.  An acceptable settlement will be possible along 
the border line between Region 4 and Region 3 provided both parties remain risk 
neutral.   
 
Bounded by the two parallel lines ( )minv p  and ( )maxv p , the existence of Region 4 
may constitute a temptation to the claimant to hope for a higher settlement than 
simply ( )minv p , on the grounds that the respondent could afford to make an offer up 
to ( )maxv p  as it would still remain within the bounds set by its expected payoff on 
appearing before the tribunal.  And, as the examples evaluated in Section 5 suggest, 
there can, on occasions, be a significant different between ( )maxv p  and ( )minv p .  
However, the respondent will see no need to do so, and would need to abandon its 
risk neutrality in favour of a strictly positive risk aversion in order to make a more 
generous offer than ( )minv p .  By the same token, a claimant turning ( )minv p  down 
would need to have moved from risk neutrality to risk confidence. 
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Based on the data collected in our sample of 31 disputes, this article proposes that if 
the claim is known and the likely legal and arbitration costs can be estimated, then a 
fair settlement offer may be found for both parties under the assumption that the 
claimant’s probability of success is the long-run average, estimated as 45 %, a figure 
that can be calculated and updated on an objective basis by each party.  Should the 
claimant’s chances be assessed as different from the long-run average, then a 
mutually acceptable settlement sum may still be found if both parties agree the new 
probability figure. 
 
The advantages of settling are that the extra costs associated with the tribunal fees 
and expenses are avoided, as well as the time, trouble and, particularly, uncertainty 
associated with what is likely to be a long drawn out process.  It may well be better 
to invest time and money in negotiating a settlement than in pursuing arbitration in 
the context of ISDS, consistent with economic analysis of the civil litigation process 
in domestic courts.11   The disadvantage for the claimant is that, assuming a success 
probability of 45%, it can expect to receive in settlement an amount that is only 
about a quarter of the claim submitted (based on historic figures) and about half the 
award it would win, should it be successful at the arbitration tribunal.  Pari passu, 
the disadvantage for the respondent is that it will need to pay out about a quarter of 
the claim, whereas it would avoid paying out more than its costs, and possibly rather 
less, if it were successfully to defend the case.  This is the nature of the negotiation 
process: the parties are looking to agree on a deal that provides certainty, but this 
involves a splitting of the difference between them. 
 
One reason why such settlements may not occur, is that the different parties have 
different estimates of the parameter values. If each believes it is likely to win at the 
tribunal, both could see a positive payoff in carrying on rather than settling at a level 
that was mutually agreeable. Similarly, if the claimant over estimates (and/or the 
respondent underestimates) the level of damages that may be awarded in the event of 
a successful claim. There will always be some uncertainty about parameter values, 
and so there will always be this danger, and this is likely an important reason why so 
many cases proceed to arbitration in reality. 
 
The study sheds further light on some of the strategic decision-making that is (or 
should be) involved when foreign investors and host states choose to engage in ISDS 
via the calculation of go-no-go probability, *p , the lowest probability at which an 
investor could reasonably decide to bring its case forward.  Sometimes, as in the case 
of Anatolie Stati et al. v Kazakhstan (Case 7 in Table 1), the figure for *p  emerges 
as so low that the case should be brought forward even when the chances of success 
look slim (e.g. 1 in 10 or less).  On the other hand, there are some cases where the 
go-no-go probability reaches 1.0, so that the case should be taken forward only if 
success is guaranteed – surely an impossibility in any situation that is reliant on 
human judgment.  Case 22, Quasar de Valors v Russia exhibited a value of 0.1*=p .  
Here the claimant won and received an award that was roughly three quarters of its 
claim, but still incurred a net financial loss.  It must be assumed that Quasar de 
                                                          
11 E.g. Cooter and Ulen, ‘An Economic Theory of the Legal Process’ in Law & Economics (4th ed, 
Pearson, 2004) 
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Valors considered that more than the stated financial claim was at stake. 
 
7.  Conclusion 
While the claimant’s chances of success may be disputed by the two parties in any 
particular case, analysis of the data suggests that the claimant has, on average, a 
slightly worse than even chance of success – about 45%.  Moreover, a claimant that 
wins at the arbitration tribunal is set to gain, on average, slightly less than half (48%) 
of the claim it has registered.  It has been found that arbitration tribunals tend to 
award a fraction of the legal costs and the arbitration costs against the loser in a 
roughly similar way, irrespective of whether the loser is an investor or a state, 
undercutting the myth that there is an anti-state animus among arbitration tribunals.12  
The losing party, state or investor, will pick up, on average, about 30% of the 
winning party’s legal cost and will be required, on average, to pick up about 66% of 
the total arbitration cost. 
 
Whilst it may be problematic to expect the parties to come to the same conclusion 
regarding the strength of the claimant’s arguments, and hence the claimant’s 
probability of winning, a more pragmatic procedure is to use the average probability 
of claimant success in previous arbitration hearings.  As noted above, the success rate 
is about 45%, and it is this figure that the paper has adopted for its calculations of 
reasonable settlement sums. 
 
The base-line calculational model assumes that both state and investor are risk 
neutral in the sense that the risk-aversion is zero for each.  This is likely to be a good 
representation for the state, which can normally be expected to have large resources 
on which to call for the purposes of dispute settlement, and also for the investor 
when the latter is a very large company.  Of course respondent states will also on 
occasion be developing countries, just as investors may be SMEs. However, the 
effects of changes to the risk-aversions of both parties have been considered.  An 
argument has been advanced for an upper boundary, with an offer at this level 
requiring the respondent to become more risk averse (exhibiting a strictly positive 
risk-aversion) under the single-offer assumption.  While it is theoretically possible 
for a highly risk-averse respondent to make a still higher settlement offer, it would 
almost certainly be restrained from doing so by its duty as a custodian of public 
funds.  Meanwhile a claimant having a strictly positive risk-aversion will be inclined 
to accept a settlement sum below the lower boundary advanced, but quantification of 
this effect would require further research. 
 
As well as calculating the settlement sum on which the parties might reasonably 
agree, the game-theoretical model provides an estimate of the go-no-go probability, 
below which the claimant ought not to bring its case forward based on the registered 
claim and likely expenses.  This figure lies well below the average claimant 
probability of success in most of the cases analysed, which suggests that it was 
reasonable for the claimant to bring the case forward (although not necessarily as far 
as the arbitration tribunal – a settlement might have been a better option).  However, 
the figure for the go-no-go probability was found to be significantly higher than the 
                                                          
12 See e.g. S Franck, ‘The ICSID Effect? Considering Potential Variations in Arbitral Awards’ 51:4 
Virginia Journal of International Law 977 (2011) 
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long-run average in four of the cases considered, and in two cases the required 
probability of success was unity, corresponding to a requirement for complete 
certainty of success.  It is conjectured that the rationale for proceeding in such a case 
must depend on the expectation that victory at arbitration will bring benefits over and 
above the monetary value of the claim registered. These benefits include 
emphasizing the financial risk associated with a host state’s undue interference with 
foreign investors. The fear of adverse awards could accordingly improve the business 
climate within the jurisdiction going forward.  
 
We conclude that the mathematical modelling of the international arbitration process 
has generated a number of insights of potential value to both claimants and 
respondents.  However, we need to issue some caveats. We acknowledge that the 
data upon which this analysis rests constitutes a small sample – only 31 cases were 
studied, with 14 non-zero awards and incomplete data for 6 disputes.  Furthermore, it 
is accepted that the probability of any specific claimant being successful will in 
general not be known, since it is only an average probability of success that can be 
inferred from observed successes in past published awards. Perhaps more pertinently, 
each party may estimate this value differently. We have also not made a 
comprehensive analysis of the claimant’s risk-aversion and how this factors into its 
decision making. In addition, real cases will likely involve the potential for a longer 
period of negotiation, rather than a single “take-it-or-leave-it” offer by the 
respondent.  We have carried out a preliminary analysis of such a situation in Section 
2 and Appendix B, and have suggested bounding values for any offer from the 
respondent that follows on from a protracted period of negotiation. Finally, we have 
not been able to take into account external factors to the process such as reputational 
effects/ political pressure, which may make settlements more difficult to achieve in 
practice. We see these areas as suitable subjects for further research (including 
modelling using the risk-aversion parameter) and hope that the paper will pave the 
way and encourage others in further analyses of the game theoretic nature of 
investment arbitration strategies.  
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Appendix A. Additional nomenclature used in Part II 
 
Symbol Meaning 
( )2
1E  share of the claimant 's legal fees borne by the respondent when the claimant wins before the tribunal 
( )1
2E   share of the respondent's legal fees borne by the claimant when the claimant loses before the tribunal 
( )
n n n nV O
f v o   probability density for the value of the respondent's nth offer, 
given that the respondent will make such an offer (Appendix B) 
g1 fraction of the arbitration costs borne by the claimant 
g2 fraction of the arbitration costs borne by the respondent 
H claimant's payoff after negotiation in Region 4 (Appendix B) 
On (random) indicator value for respondent's nth offer (1 if made, 
else 0) (Appendix B) 
on specified indicator value for respondent's nth offer (1 or 0) 
(Appendix B) 
rAC ratio of the tribunal award to the claim 
SCC claim 
V binary variable taking the value, 1, when the claimant wins and 0 
otherwise 
Vn (random) value of respondent's nth offer (Appendix B) 
vn specified value of respondent's nth offer (Appendix B) 
xˆ   estimated value of x 
avex   average value of x (equivalent to x ) 
nπ   probability of the respondent making n
th offer (Appendix B) 
Xσ   estimated standard deviation of X 
Xσ  estimated standard deviation of the average of X , also known as 
the standard error.  
 
 
Appendix B.  Preliminary consideration of Region 4, the “zone of uncertainty” 
 
Suppose that the rules or convention allow the respondent to make a second offer if 
the claimant rejects the respondent's first offer, ( )minv p  , in anticipation of a further, 
better offer.  The respondent now has a choice on whether or not to make a second 
offer, 2V  , where ( ) ( ) ( )min 2 maxv p V p v p≤ ≤ , or the respondent may decide to go 
straight to the tribunal.  2V  must be regarded as a random variable by the claimant – 
it cannot predict it with any certainty in advance. 
 
Let 2 1O =  if the respondent makes a second offer and 2 0O = if the respondent 
decides to proceed to arbitration instead.  Let there be a probability, ( )2 2 1P Oπ = = , 
that a second offer be made, so that the probability of going before the tribunal is 
21 π− .  
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Let the probability density for the size of the respondent's second offer, given that it 
is made, be ( )
2 2 2 2V O
f v o .  Thus the expected size of the respondent’s second offer, if 
it is made, will be between minv  and maxv : 
 
( ) ( )
max
2 2
2 min
2 2 2 2 2 2
v
V O
v v
E V O f v o v dv
=
= ∫   (B.1) 
 
where  
 
( )
max
2 2
2 min
2 2 2 1
v
V O
v v
f v o dv
=
=∫   (B.2) 
 
The claimant's payoff, H, given that a second offer is made (and accepted), is: 
 
( ) ( )2 1 2 2 11 1v PTH O A O V E= = = = −    (B.3) 
 
Applying the expectation operator, ( ).E , to both sides of equation (B.3) gives: 
 
( ) ( )2 2 2 11 PTE H O E V O E= = −   (B.4) 
 
The claimant’s payoff, H, given a second offer is not made, will depend on the 
outcome of the arbitration, namely either 1B , with probability, p,  or 1C , with 
probability 1 p− .  The expected payoff in this case is: 
 
( ) ( )2 1 10 1E H O pB p C= = + −   (B.5) 
 
The overall expected value of H is given by 
 
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( )( ) ( ) ( )( )
( )( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
max
2 2
2 min
2
2 2 2 2
2 2 2 1 2 1 1
2 2 2 1 2 min 1
2 2 2 2 min 1
2 2 2 2 2 2 min 1
1 1 0
1 1 1
1 1
1 1
1
PT
PT PT
PT
v
PTV O
v v
E H E E H O
E H O E H O
E V O E pB p C
E V O E v E
E V O v E
f v o v dv v E
π π
π π
π π
π π
π π
=
=
= = + − =
= = − + − + −
= = − + − −
= = + − −
= + − −∫
  (B.6) 
 
Comparing equation (B.6) with equation (1) of Part I, repeated below: 
 
1 1v PTA v E= −   (Part I – 1) 
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the agreed settlement, 1vA , will match the expected value of the outturn, ( )E H , 
provided the settlement offer, 2V , is given by: 
 
( ) ( )
max
2 2
2 min
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 min1
v
V O
v v
v f v o v dv vπ π
=
= + −∫   (B.7) 
 
Clearly 2 minv v=  only if 
• 2 0π = , i.e. if there is no chance that a second offer will be made,  
• or the expected value of the second offer is equal to minv : 
( )
max
2 2
2 min
2 2 2 2 min
v
V O
v v
f v o v dv v
=
=∫   (B.8) 
 
Equation (B.8) would imply that the probability density function would be a Dirac 
impulse of unit strength and the only second offer that could be made would be 
deterministic and equal to minv , meaning that the respondent will simply repeat its 
offer.  In all other cases, 2 minv v> . 
 
If the probability density, ( )
2 2 2 2V O
f v o  is positive over some finite portion of the 
range, minv  to maxv , and 2π  is strictly positive: 20 1π< ≤ , then in rejecting the first 
offer, the claimant is preferring an uncertain outcome, but with a higher expected 
value, to the certain offer.  Superficially such a stance might seem reasonable for 
even a risk averse organisation.  However, neither the probability density function, 
( )
2 2 2 2V O
f v o , nor the probability, 2π , will be known beyond the general 
requirements that equation (B.2) should hold for ( )
2 2 2 2V O
f v o , while 2π  is bounded 
by: 
 
20 1π≤ ≤     (B.9) 
 
Hence Region 4 represents a zone of uncertainty. 
 
Furthermore, real-world experience suggests that if the claimant should decide to 
reject successively the respondent’s offers, 2, 3, ..., n, in the hope of pushing the 
respondent closer to  offering maxv ,  then at some intermediate point, 
( ) ( ) ( )min maxnv p v p v p≤ < , the probability of the respondent making any further 
offer will have reached zero: 0nπ = .  In such a case the claimant will have been in 
the position of rejecting a guaranteed sum, ( )1nv p− , in favour of the risky option of 
appearing before the tribunal, with its associated lower expected payoff (given by the 
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right hand side of equation (B.5) above).  The claimant would then be displaying risk 
confident or risk seeking behaviour: 0ε < . 
 
It is, of course, possible that the respondent will not make a second offer, in which 
case 2n = , and 2 0π = .  In this case the claimant will effectively have rejected a 
certain offer, minv , in favour of a risky option with the same expected value, 
suggesting marginally risk seeking behaviour. 
 
If we assume that all parameters are known exactly, both players are risk neutral, and 
that there is some maximum number of allowable offers, then logically the claimant 
should not go to the tribunal for any offer marginally over minv , and thus effectively 
the respondent should just repeat this offer (i.e. choose the Dirac distribution 
mentioned above) until the end of the process, when it will be accepted. However, if 
we added some possibility of parameter estimates being different, an offer rejection 
by the claimant might be interpreted by the respondent that the claimant has a higher 
estimate of p than the respondent has, and so encourage a higher offer. Note that such 
a rejection might be a tactical move by the claimant, even if this was not actually the 
case. 
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Table 1. Summary of case data (All costs and awards in USD); CW = claimant wins, CL = claimant loses 
 
Case 
No. 
Claimant 
Cost, 1E  
Respondent 
Cost, 2E  
Claimant 
Win 
V = 1 
Claim 
CCS  
Award 
to Claimant 
CS  
Arbitration 
Cost, AE  
CL 
1f  
 CW 
2f  
Claimant 
share 
Arb.Cost, 
1AE  
Resp 
share 
Arb. 
Cost, 
2AE  
CW 
1g  
 CL 
2g  
CW 
Award 
to claim 
ratio, 
ACR  
1 2,594,404 1,866,421    331,267 0.00  165,634 165,634  0.50  
2 9,874,653 4,574,990  8,700,000   1.00       
3 2,229,829 5,238,568  6,989,000   0.00       
4 1,571,858 5,299,978    1,150,000 0.30  575,000 575,000  0.50  
5 664,997 414,797 1 142,300,000 28,927,582 1,022,462  0.00 511,231 511,231 0.50  0.203 
6 9,277,500 4,500,000 1 243,600,000 21,100,522 1,500,000  0.75 375,000 1,125,000 0.25  0.087 
7 17,950,992 17,625,116 1 2,970,000,000 497,685,101 1,400,000  0.50 350,000 1,050,000 0.25  0.168 
8 24,478,538 15,273,967 1 805,581,502 113,138,596 2,995,000  0.00 1,497,500 1,497,500 0.50  0.140 
9 2,184,456 5,602,042     0.00       
10 1,112,000 7,410,954  173,962,625  1,150,000 0.00  575,000 575,000  0.50  
11 532,800 2,004,190    307,029 0.00  153,515 153,515  0.50  
12  705,814  8,000,000  277,863 1.00  138,932 138,932  0.50  
13 540,596 463,367  12,600,000  186,450 1.00   186,450 0  0.00  
14 8,000,000 10,750,000  185,385,084   0.00       
15    149,546  19,706 0.00  19,706 0  0.00  
16   1 1,144,930,000 935,000,000 1,940,000  1.00 0 1,940,000 0.00  0.817 
17 5,961,109 17,365,479 1 100,000,000 28,421,677 873,455  0.75 436,727 436,727 0.50  0.284 
18 7,995,127 2,822,435 1 60,368,993 60,368,993 960,928  1.00 480,464 480,464 0.50  1.000 
19 1,018,825 917,021  514,604,506  607,890 0.17  303,945 303,945  0.50  
20   1 1,769,625,000 1,769,625,000   0.00     1.000 
21 4,221,427 5,312,107     1.00       
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Case 
No. 
Claimant 
Cost, 1E  
Respondent 
Cost, 2E  
Claimant 
Win 
V = 1 
Claim 
CCS  
Award 
to Claimant 
CS  
Arbitration 
Cost, AE  
CL 
1f  
 CW 
2f  
Claimant 
share 
Arb.Co
st, 1AE  
Resp 
share 
Arb. 
Cost, 
2AE  
CW 
1g  
 CL 
2g  
CW 
Award 
to claim 
ratio, 
ACR  
22 14,572,671 9,412,260 1 2,625,810 2,026,480 1,264,096  0.00 632,048 632,048 0.50  0.772 
23 2,170,084 3,657,121 1 24,451,645 450,117   0.00     0.018 
24   1 63,778,212 11,306,741 384,854  0.00   0.00  0.177 
25 5,185,928 6,297,557  56,100,000  1,005,325 0.32  502,663 502,663  0.50  
26 6,923,000 15,675,000  1,149,000,000  1,725,000 0.19  975,000 750,000  0.43  
27 15,786,490 3,640,566 1 147,800,000 136,138,430 1,631,297   0.00 815,649 815,649 0.50  0.921 
28 3,407,687 1,647,969 1 8,800,000 4,065,900 876,815  0.00 438,408 438,408 0.50  0.462 
29 2,714,966 16,511,889  344,353,074  1,114,379 0.16  1,114,379 0  0.00  
30 2,829,688 1,283,872  459,700,000  904,403 0.00  904,403 0  0.00  
31 2,913,786 728,207 1 61,525,950 39,025,950 673,923  0.00 0 673,923 0.00  0.634 
   14    17 14   12 12 14 
Mean   0.452    0.302 0.286   0.333 0.328 0.477 
s.d.       0.413 0.414   0.222 0.243 0.366 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
23 
 
Table 2.  List of ISDS cases 
 
 
 
Case No. Parties Year 
1 Emmis International Holding et al. vs. Hungary 2014 
2 Tulip Real Estate and Development vs. Turkey 2014 
3 Renee Rose Levy de Levi vs. Peru 2014 
4 Renee and Gramcital vs. Peru 2014 
5 Guaracachi America and Rurelec vs. Bolivia 2014 
6 TECO Guatamala Holdings vs. Guatemala 2013 
7 Anatolie Stati et al. vs. Kazakhstan 2013 
8 Ioan Micula et al. vs. Romania 2013 
9 KT Asia Investment Group vs. Kazakhstan 2013 
10 Metal-Tech vs. Uzbekistan 2013 
11 Omer Dede and Serdar Elhuseyni vs. Romania 2013 
12 Apotex vs. USA 2013 
13 Burimi SRL and Eagle Games vs. Albania 2013 
14 Rompetrol Group vs. Romania 2013 
15 Bogdanov and Bogdanova vs. Moldova 2013 
16 Abdulmohsen Al-Kharafi and Sons vs. Libya 2013 
17 ACHMEA vs. Slovak Republic 2012 
18 Deutsche Bank vs. Sri Lanka 2012 
19 Bosh International et al. vs. Ukraine 2012 
20 Occidental Petroleum vs. Ecuador 2012 
21 Iberdrola Energia vs. Guatemala 2012 
22 Quasar de Valors vs. Russia 2012 
23 Swisslion vs. Republic of Macedonia 2012 
24 Railroad Development Corporation vs. Guatemala 2012 
25 Ulysseas vs. Ecuador 2012 
26 Caratube International Oil vs. Kazakhstan 2012 
27 EDF International et al. vs. Argentina 2012 
28 Unglaube and Unglaube vs. Costa Rica 2012 
29 Oostergetel and Laurentius vs. Slovak Republic 2012 
30 Sax et al. vs. The City of St Petersburg 2012 
31 Societe Generale vs. Paraguay 2012 
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Figure 1.  Game tree for arbitration. (C = claimant, R = respondent).  The range of 
offers the respondent may make at vertex Y is very large.  The analysis will show 
that there will a unique offer that the respondent would make that will be acceptable 
to the claimant. 
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Figure 2.  The settlement space in the plane of (p, v).  The figure illustrates also the 
case where claimant and respondent have estimated claimant success probability, p, 
differently: the claimant's estimate is Cp  while the respondent's is Rp .
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Figure 3.  Go-no-go probability, p*, for the 31 cases in the study.   
Also shown is the estimated probability of success for the claimant, pave , with the 
90% confidence interval marked up. 
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Figure 4.  Settlement space for Anatolie Stati and others v Republic of Kazakhstan, 
December 19 2013 (Case 7 in Table 1) 
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Figure 5.  Settlement space for Burimi SRL and Eagle Games v Republic of Albania, 
May 29 2013 (Case 13 in Table 1)  
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Figure 6. Settlement space for ACHMEA v Slovak Republic,  
December 7 2012 (Case 17 in Table 1) 
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